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ABSTRACT 
Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, 
this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-
setting organizations (SSOs).  It concludes that competition policy should not favor 
patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, 
that SSOs should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before 
standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal 
ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow 
or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates.  Some recent policy 
developments in this area are discussed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 This essay is concerned with several competition policy questions related to standard-
setting organizations (SSOs), in which industry participants, perhaps with some customer 
representation, voluntarily come together and attempt to produce consensus standards.  SSOs 
have a long history.  The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards 
Association (IEEE-SA), for instance, grew out of standard-setting activity that began in 
1890.1  SSOs have played an increasingly important role in the advance of the information 
technology and telecommunications sectors.  Chiao et al [2007] have identified 59 SSOs 
operating in that arena, and they do not claim to have found them all.  As of 2001, the IEEE-
SA alone had 866 active standards and 526 projects in hand, with over 450 technical working 
groups and committees.2    
 Antitrust authorities generally approve of voluntary standard-setting, particularly when 
compatibility standards are involved,3 despite the authorities’ general hostility toward 
collaboration among competitors.  Section II illustrates one effect that rationalizes this stance, 
using a simple model that is employed in later sections.  To the extent that adopting a 
compatibility standard reduces differentiation, it tends to intensify price competition.  If it also 
expands the market enough so that it is nonetheless profitable for producers, then all else 
(including royalty rates) equal, it makes consumers better off in this model even though they 
value product diversity. 
 At some level it is surprising that voluntary standard-setting works at all.4  Standard-
setting processes often involve diverse interests, including innovation specialists that only 
provide intellectual property, manufacturing specialists that do not innovate, and integrated 
 firms that both innovate and manufacture.  Decisions made by SSOs can have significant and 
divergent implications for the value of intellectual property and other assets held by SSO 
participants.  Moreover, modern standards are often quite complex and cannot be used 
without licenses to large numbers of patents held by many firms.  The MPEG-2 standard, for 
instance, involves 425 patents with 28 owners.5  Not only do most standard-setting processes 
nonetheless seem to produce socially valuable standards, some evidence suggests that they 
tend to select particularly promising technologies and thereby to enhance their impact.6  A 
few recent, high-profile antitrust proceedings in the US and EU have involved standard-
setting, but their number seems small relative to the total volume of standard-setting activity.7 
 Two reasons are frequently given for this performance.  First, the large integrated 
firms that have traditionally dominated standard-setting processes typically have large patent 
portfolios that could potentially be used in mutually destructive infringement litigation.  To 
avoid this outcome, it is argued, integrated firms typically engage in mutual forbearance and 
charge low royalty rates to each other.8  Second, in technology-based industries the same 
firms tend to interact with each other repeatedly over time.  This means that ‘bad’ behavior by 
any firm in any one standard-setting process can be punished by others in subsequent 
processes; see DeLacey et al [2006]. 
 Nonetheless, it seems to be widely believed that standard-setting has become more 
difficult and more contentious in recent years.  Many observers have argued that the US 
Patent Office has been awarding patents too easily and that US courts have been too willing to 
uphold the validity of dubious patents.9  To the extent that patent policy inflates the number 
of patents that must be licensed in order to practice a standard, it contributes to what has bee
called a ‘patent thicket’ through which standard-setting must pass. This clearly complicates 
n 
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 standard-setting and may make standards less socially valuable.10  As my concern here is with 
antitrust policy, however, I will treat patent policy as given.   
 A second complicating development, and the one with which this essay is primarily 
concerned, is the rise of innovation specialists, firms that license intellectual property but do 
not produce tangible products.11  The growth of such firms has been one of the most 
important developments since around 1990 in industries in which intellectual property is 
important.12  Separation of innovation from manufacturing permits individual firms to focus 
on what they do best and is thus potentially efficiency-enhancing.  Moreover, vertical 
disintegration is normally more likely to alleviate competition policy concerns than to r
them.  The potentially disruptive complication is that innovation specialists are much less 
vulnerable to infringement suits than manufacturers and thus have less incentive to engage 
the sort of mutual forbearance described above.  It is thus not surprising that innovation 
specialists have been the defendants in a number of recent high-profile SSO-related
aise 
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ity.  In 2006, for instance, four Justices 
of the U
ese 
ould also use injunctions for this purpose, as 
well as for other socially undesirable purposes.   
proceedings.13 
 It is similarly unsurprising there has emerged significant hostility toward innovation 
specialists within at least parts of the policy commun
S Supreme Court signed an opinion stating 
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not for producing and 
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.  For th
firms, an injunction … can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge 
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.14 
Of course, firms that do produce and sell goods c
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  Innovation specialists have been accused of three forms of behavior that adversely 
affect social welfare.  Perhaps the most common accusation is that they behave as patent 
trolls.   Just as trolls in folk tales hide under bridges and emerge suddenly to demand tolls 
from unsuspecting travelers, so patent trolls hide their intellectual property until an opportune 
time and then emerge to extract royalties.15  In the standard-setting context, the opportune 
time is typically after their intellectual property has been embodied in a standard and, perhaps, 
after additional standard-specific costs have been sunk.  This term has sometimes been 
applied to all innovation specialists, but it seems best to reserve it for those – specialists or not 
– that engage in troll-like deceptive behavior.   
 It seems generally agreed in the US and the EU that deception on the part of a patent-
holder that alters the choice of technology within a standard-setting process so as to increase 
the patent-holder’s ex post market power significantly is an antitrust violation.  The recent 
Rambus case in the US, however, suggests that it may generally be difficult to prove that a 
different standard would have been adopted but for particular deceptive acts.16  SSOs 
commonly attempt to prevent troll-like behavior by various rules requiring participants to 
disclose their intellectual property, but such rules cannot eliminate such behavior.17  
 The other two accusations, with which this essay is primarily concerned, involve 
charges of excessive or abusive royalties.  The behaviors involved are sometimes lumped 
together, but they are analytically quite distinct.  The first is patent hold-up.  When 
technology covered by a patent is included in a standard, the ex ante value of that patent may 
be increased substantially ex post.  It seems broadly consistent with most of the literature to 
say that patent hold-up occurs when a patent-holder demands royalties ex post that are above 
the reasonable ex ante expectations of potential licensees, expectations that presumably reflect 
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 the patent’s ex ante value rather than its ex post value.  Thus defined, patent hold-up does not 
necessarily involve hiding the existence of intellectual property, but it generally does involve 
at least some deception (perhaps only misleading silence) regarding licensing terms and 
conditions.  If ex post royalties are in line with ex ante expectations, it seems reasonable to 
say that there is no hold-up.18   
 Over the years, many SSOs have required participants to commit ex ante to charge 
royalty rates that are reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) or, particularly in Europe, 
fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). 19  These commitments at least oblige 
patent-holders to negotiate non-exclusive licenses in good faith; some have argued that they 
carry with them additional obligations as regards licensing terms and conditions.20   Despite 
this ambiguity, FRAND commitments seem to have worked reasonably well to make essential 
patents generally available at acceptable royalty rates.  The IEEE-SA [2002], for instance, 
testified that ‘[w]ith very few exceptions, this approach has worked very successfully for at 
least the past twenty years.’ 
 Finally, innovation specialists are sometimes also accused of royalty-stacking.  In a 
classic analysis, Cournot [1838] showed that in a one-period model, two unaffiliated 
monopolists selling complementary products would set higher prices than a single monopolist 
selling both products.  In the standard-setting context this analysis implies that if the patents 
essential to a standard are in multiple hands, total royalty rates will be higher than if all 
essential patents had a single owner.  Because Cournot’s model assumes away important 
aspects of reality, especially repeated interactions among participants in SSOs, the importance 
of this effect in general or in any particular standardization process must be an empirical 
question, which has yet to receive a definitive answer.21  
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  Section III contrasts royalty rate determination by innovation specialists and by 
integrated firms in the absence of hold-up.  Royalty-stacking emerges in both cases.  And, 
while upstream innovation specialists face a more severe double marginalization problem than 
integrated firms would, the latter have the incentive to diminish competition by raising rivals’ 
costs.  This analysis provides no basis for a general policy tilt against innovation specialists.   
 Sections IV and V consider two proposed responses to hold-up and royalty-stacking.  
In an influential paper, Swanson and Baumol [2005, esp. pp. 16-18] advocated the use of 
formal ex ante competition, which they suggested might be implemented via an auction, to 
determine royalty rates in SSOs.  If an auction or other similarly transparent, arms-length ex 
ante process were a workable mechanism for royalty determination, antitrust authorities might 
either require or actively encourage SSOs to employ it.  However, Section IV shows that 
formal ex ante competition is unlikely to be workable in practice, importantly because there is 
generally no formulaic way to compare competing bids by innovation specialists and 
integrated firms. 
 Section V considers the alternative of allowing potential licensees operating in SSOs 
to engage in collective negotiation of royalty terms ex ante, before a standard has been set.  
Though a clear departure from antitrust’s general hostility toward cartels, this approach has 
been favorably discussed by policy-makers in both the US and the EU.  Section V shows that 
the different strategic incentives of innovation specialists and integrated firms may distort 
technology choice under collective negotiation and argues that licensee collusion may unduly 
reduce incentives to innovate and thereby slow technical progress. 
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  Section VI concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the analysis of 
preceding sections for competition policy responses to the difficulties that seem to beset 
contemporary standard-setting organizations and processes.  
 
II. AN ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL 
 This section introduces an illustrative two-stage oligopoly model that is employed in 
Sections III-V and uses it to illustrate a simple point about the benefits of voluntary 
standardization.  Consider a simple economy with the following representative consumer 
utility function: 
(1)                   0
1 1
1
2
N N
i i i
i i j i
U X X X X Xα γ
= = ≠
⎛ ⎞= + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑ j   
Here X0 is consumption of the numeraire good, produced competitively at constant unit cost 
and price of 1, 0α > and [ ]0,1γ ∈ are constants, and X1 ... XN are the outputs of N Cournot 
oligopolists, each with constant unit cost C.  When 0γ = , goods 1 through N are independent 
in demand, while when 1γ =  they are perfect substitutes. 
 If Pi is the price of good i, equation (1) implies the following inverse demand 
functions: 
(2)   ,i i
j i
P X Xα γ
≠
= − − j∑   i =1, …, N. 
Substituting the budget constraint with total income I into (1) and using (2) then yields 
(3)   
1
1 .
2
N
i i j
i j i
U I X X Xγ
= ≠
⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
 We simplify⎯and follow most of the literature⎯by assuming all royalties are linear 
in output.22  Let there be K upstream innovation specialists, each with patents that are 
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 essential for production of the final product according to some standard, and let Sk be the 
royalty charged per unit of final output by specialist k to each downstream manufacturing 
firm.  Similarly, let Ri be the per-unit royalty charged by manufacturing firm i for its essential 
patents to each other manufacturing firm.  (If firm j is a manufacturing specialist, with no 
essential intellectual patents, Rj = 0.)  Let S be the sum of the Sk,  and R be the sum of the Ri.  
Then firm i’s profits are given by 
(4)  ( ) ,i i i j i i
j i j i
jX X X R R S C Rα γ
≠ ≠
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞Π = − − − − − − +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
X∑ ∑   i = 1, …, N. 
Sections III – V consider two stage games in which royalty rates are selected in the first stage 
and outputs are selected in the second, taking royalty rates as given.23   
 To solve the second stage, differentiate (4) with respect to Xi and add across i: 
(5)   ( )( )1
( 1)
,
2 1
N
i
i
N S C N R
X
N
α
γ=
− − − −= + −∑  
Substitution into (4) then yields 
(6)  
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 1 2
,
2 2 1
i j
j i
i
S C N R R
X
N
α γ γ
γ γ
≠
− − − + − −
= − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
∑
 i = 1, …, N. 
 In this simple world with one-component products, no network effects, and a host of 
other real-world complications absent, the most natural way to model standardization is as an 
agreement by firms 1, …, N to increase γ .  Since such an agreement would reduce 
differentiation and thus intensify price competition in this model, firms 1, …, N would accept 
it only if it also expanded their markets by also increasing α .  To illustrate the implications of 
such an agreement most simply, let us assume Ri = Rj for all i and j, and let β denote the total 
royalties paid per unit of output by each manufacturing firm,  
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 (7)    β ≡ S + (N-1)R/N.    
Then substituting (6) into (4) produces 
(8)   
2
1
,
2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
N
i
i
C CN
N N
α β α ββγ γ=
⎫⎤⎧⎡ ⎡ ⎤− − − − ⎪Π = +⎥⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎢ ⎥+ − + −⎥⎣ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎪⎦ ⎭
∑  
and substitution of (6) into (3) and simplifying yields 
(9)   
( ) 21 1
.
2 2 ( 1)
N CU I
N
γ α β
γ
+ −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦= + ⎢ ⎥+ −⎣ ⎦  
In this symmetric case, ∂U/∂γ < 0: consumers’ preference for variety in this model is strong 
enough that standardization that does not increase α makes them worse off even though it 
intensifies competition among manufacturing firms. 
 With β fixed, examination of the derivatives of (8) and (9) with respect to both α and γ 
serves to demonstrate that small increases in γ and α that together increase total profit must 
increase consumer utility and thus total economic welfare.  The converse is not true: there are 
always (Δγ, Δα) combinations that increase utility but not profit and would thus not be 
voluntarily adopted.24  If standardization also involves a change in β, however, no such 
general results are available.  While an increase in β always reduces U by decreasing output, it 
may thereby increase or decrease total profit.   
 
 III. STRATEGIC ROYALTY-SETTING 
 Using the model just introduced, and assuming away complications related to hold-up 
and the ex ante/ex post distinction (on which the following two sections focus), this section 
compares royalty-setting behavior by innovation specialists and integrated firms. 
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  We first show that royalty-stacking arises with both integrated firms and innovation 
specialists.  Suppose initially that the intellectual property that is essential for some standard 
is divided among K upstream innovation specialists.  From (5), the stage 1 objective of the kth 
such firm is 
(10)   1 ,
2 ( 1)
K
j
j
k k
N S
S
N
α
γ
=
⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠Π = + −
∑ C
   k = 1, …, K, 
The corresponding one-shot Nash equilibrium royalty rates are given by 
(11)   ( ) ,
1k
K CS KS
K
α −= = +     k = 1, …, K. 
The total per-unit royalty paid by each downstream firm, S, is increasing in K and tends to    
(α – C) in the limit as K increases. In this limit, total downstream output is zero.   
 Suppose now that there are N manufacturing firms, as above, and firms 1, …, K, 
where K ≤ N, have essential intellectual property.  Substituting (5) and (6) into (4) to obtain 
the stage 1 objective function of a typical integrated firm yields 
(12) 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2 1 2
2 2 1
1 2 2 1 4 2
, 1,..., .
2 2 1
i j
j i
i
i j
j i
i
C N R R
N
N C N R N N R
R i K
N
γ α γ
γ γ
γ α γ γ
γ γ
≠
≠
⎧ ⎫− − + − −⎪ ⎪Π = ⎨ ⎬− + −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
− − − − − + + − −
+ =− + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
∑
∑
 
The first term on the right here is the firm’s operating profit; the second is its royalty revenue.  
 Setting the derivative of (11) with respect to Ri equal to zero and solving yields a quite 
complex expression even when symmetry is imposed.  The special case of perfect 
downstream substitutes (γ =1) serves to illustrate the main point, however.  In this case, 
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 (13)  ( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )2
3 1
,
1 2 7 1 2i
C N N
R
K N N N N
α − + −= − + − + − + 6  i = 1, …, K 
Integrated firms pay total per-unit royalties equal to (K-1) times this quantity, while firms 
K+1, …, N pay K times this quantity.  It is easy to show that both these total royalty rates rise 
with K.  If K = N, so that all manufacturing firms are integrated, each pays 
(14)   ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 31 ,4 1i
N N
N R C
N N
α − +− = − + −   i = 1, …, N. 
The right-hand side of (14) is increasing in N and in the limit approaches (α – C), the 
aggregate royalty rate that drives downstream output to zero, exactly as when all essential 
intellectual property is held by innovation specialists.  Thus royalty-stacking arises when 
essential (and thus complementary) intellectual property is divided among multiple owners, 
whether or not those owners are also engaged in manufacturing.  
 In models of this sort, royalty-setting by integrated firms and by innovation specialists 
is affected by a number of strategic considerations.25  First, if all firms involved are 
integrated, they can use cooperatively set royalty rates to raise marginal costs just enough to 
induce monopoly output in stage 2.26  Second, because downstream competition is imperfect, 
upstream innovation specialists’ ability to extract profit via royalty income is limited by 
vertical double marginalization: downstream manufacturers add markups to the royalty costs 
they pay, thus tending to raise final prices too high for maximization of total profit.  Each 
integrated firm avoids this problem with respect to its own output, but its competitors mark up 
the royalties it charges them.  Finally, the payoff to each integrated firm individually from 
raising its rivals’ costs, thus reducing their output and increasing the first term on the right of 
(4), leads to aggressive royalty-setting in the absence of collusion.  In fact in this model the 
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 raising-rivals’-cost effect is so strong when γ = 1 that it is easily shown that collusive royalty-
setting among N integrated firms yields higher output than non-cooperative royalty-setting.   
 Two further examples are illuminating.  First, when γ = 1we can use (11) with N 
replacing K and (14) to compare the case in which N innovation specialists set royalties for N 
manufacturing firms with the case in which N integrated firms non-cooperatively set royalties 
for each other.  This comparison demonstrates that, as Schmidt [2008] has previously shown, 
the equilibrium royalty charged by each integrated firm, Ri, is higher than the rate charged by 
each innovation specialist, Sk.  Schmidt [2008] has also shown, however, that the reverse 
holds when demand for the final product is log-linear. 
 In this first example, when royalties are set upstream each producing firm pays NSk, 
while if they are set by integrated firms (which don’t pay royalties to themselves) each 
producing firm pays (N – 1)Ri.  It is easy to show that the former quantity exceeds the latter 
under the linear demand assumption made here, and it follows from the Schmidt [2008] result 
cited just above that it also does with log-linear demand.  Accordingly, in this two-stage 
model with linear or constant-elasticity demand for the final product and γ = 1, output and 
consumer welfare are higher when N integrated firms charge royalties to each other than 
when N manufacturing specialists are charged royalties by N innovation specialists.27   
 A second example, which is explored further in Sections IV and V, involves 
comparing the case in which all essential intellectual property is owned by a single innovation 
specialist with the case in which all such property is owned by a single integrated firm, firm 1, 
say.  From (11), an innovation specialist would charge all N downstream firms S1 = 0.5(α – 
C).    Differentiating (12) for i = 1 with respect to R1 and setting Rj = 0 for j ≠ 1 yields 
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 (15)  ( )( ) 2 21 2 24 2 22 .16 16 8 6 6
N NR C
N N
γ γ γ γα γ γ γ γ γ
− + + −= − − − + + −  
This quantity equals S1 for γ = 0 and γ = 1.  For intermediate values of γ and for 2 ≤ N ≤ 30, 
numerical evaluation reveals 0.45(α – C) < R1 < S1.   
 When γ = 0, the integrated firm 1 is effectively an upstream supplier of intellectual 
property to all other manufacturers, and it charges the same royalty rate as would an 
innovation specialist, S1.  For γ > 0, firm 1 faces competition from firms 2, …, N, and its 
incentive to increase their costs rises with γ.  The equilibrium ratio of X1 to Xj for j ≠ 1 is 2 
when γ = 0 because of double marginalization: its competitors mark up R1, but firm 1 does 
not.  This ratio rises with γ, and, as Kim [2004] has shown, when γ = 1, firm 1’s optimal 
royalty rate is so high that all other firms produce zero.   
 Straightforward computation reveals that because an integrated firm always faces a 
smaller double marginalization problem in this example, for 0 ≤ γ  ≤ 1 and 2 ≤ N  ≤ 30, total 
output and consumer utility are higher if it owns the essential intellectual property than if that 
property is owned by an innovation specialist.  On the other hand, if royalties are charged by 
an integrated firms, the mix of final products is distorted except when γ  = 1 (there is only one 
product), and this affects profit except when γ = 0 (the products aren’t substitutes).  Total 
industry profit may be higher or lower than when an innovation specialist owns the essential 
intellectual property for 0 < γ < 1.  Total profit is higher with an innovation specialist, for 
instance, when γ = 0.7 and N > 2.  (Larger values of N always reduce the double 
marginalization problem.)  
 Competition policy is based on the presumption that market forces should generally be 
allowed to determine firms’ boundaries and activity mixes.  The analysis of strategic royalty-
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 setting in this section does not support departing from that presumption and biasing public 
policy either for or against innovation specialists.  
 
IV. FORMAL EX ANTE COMPETITION 
 This section evaluates the potential of formal ex ante competition to mitigate royalty-
stacking and hold-up when standards involve multiple patents.  We first exhibit conditions 
under which a formal, transparent royalty-rate bidding process that could be carried out by a 
third party completely solves these problems. 28   
  Suppose that in order for a standard to be viable, it needs one technology, assumed for 
convenience to be covered by patents held by a single firm, for each of M components.  Let us 
also assume, again mainly for convenience, that there are unique best and second-best 
technologies for each component, defined in terms of incremental contribution to the value of 
the standard, regardless of which technologies are used for the other components.29  (It will be 
clear that only the first- and second-best technologies can matter in equilibrium.)  
 Four additional substantive assumptions ensure that formal ex ante competition works 
well in this model.  The consequences of relaxing each are discussed below. 
(1) All potential standards would yield a new product of exactly the same quality, so 
they differ only in the unit cost of production they would imply.   
(2) All manufacturers are concerned with only the total unit cost (production cost plus 
royalty cost) implied by each possible standard; they do not care who owns the 
underlying intellectual property.   
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 (3) The unit cost of producing the final product using any potential standard is known 
and is the same for all manufacturers.  Let that cost be given by the function 
    C(d1, d2, …, dN), 
where di = 1 if the best technology is used for component i, and di = 2 if the second-
best technology is used.   
(4) Total sales of the final product will be some fixed number of units as long as total 
production plus royalty cost is less than or equal to CT and zero otherwise. 
Let ai ≥ 0 be the per-unit royalty charged for the best technology for component i, and let bi ≥ 
0 be the rate charged for the second-best technology.  Licensing costs are neglected 
throughout for simplicity.   
 Suppose first that M = 1 and that the owners of the two technologies simultaneously 
announce their royalties.  The conditions for the first-best technology to be selected as the 
standard and for that standard to be used are, respectively,  
(16a)    a1 ≤ b1 + [C(2) – C(1)], and 
(16b)    a1 ≤ CT – C(1). 
 The quantity in brackets on the right of (16a) is non-negative by the definition of first- and 
second-best technologies.  If a1 is less than or equal to that quantity, the first-best technology 
will be selected regardless of the value of b1.  In this simple case, then, the obvious 
competitive outcome is a1 = Min{CT – C(1), C(2) – C(1)} and b1 = 0. 
 Next, consider the case M = 2.  In the sort of Bertrand regime we are considering here, 
ex ante competition is provided by the willingness of the owners of the second-best 
technologies to license them at any non-negative rates.  Setting b1 = b2 = 0 accordingly, the 
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 inequalities corresponding to (16) that must be satisfied in order for the standard with the 
lowest production cost to be selected and to be used are the following: 
(17a)   a1 ≤ C(2,1) – C(1,1) ≡ Δ1 
(17b)   a2  ≤ C(1,2) – C(1,1) ≡ Δ2 
(17c)   a1 + a2 ≤ C(2,2) – C(1,1) ≡ Δ12 
(17d)   a1 + a2 ≤ CT – C(1,1) ≡ Δ11 
By the definition of first- and second-best technologies, all the right-hand sides of these 
inequalities are non-negative. 
 Suppose the owners of the first-best technologies for components 1 and 2 submit bids 
a1 and a2 simultaneously.  If all of inequalities (17) are satisfied, the firm bidding ai receives 
that royalty rate times the (fixed) number of units sold, i = 1,2.  If not, all firms receive zero. 
 This game clearly has at least one Nash equilibrium.  Because the right-hand sides of  
(17) are all non-negative, all these inequalities are satisfied by a1 = a2 = 0.  An equilibrium is 
a pair of non-negative a’s such that neither can be increased without violating one or more of 
these inequalities.  If at the point a1 = a2 = 0 neither royalty rate can be increased, that point is 
the unique equilibrium.  Otherwise, one or more equilibria can be found by increasing one or 
both of the ai until one of inequalities (17) holds with equality. 
 It follows from the analysis of Layne-Farrar et al [2007] that there may be many 
equilibria of this game and that if one first-best technology has a good substitute and the other 
does not, the latter will generally command higher royalties in equilibrium.  In particular, if 
the first- and second-best technologies for component 1, say, are equivalent, so Δ1 = 0, then a1 
= 0 in equilibrium.  At the other extreme, if there is only one plausible technology for 
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 component 2, so that C(1,2) and C(2,2) are very large, then (17b) and (17c) are irrelevant, and 
a2 is only constrained by (17d).  If Δ1 = 0 also, so a1 = 0 in equilibrium, then a2 = CT – C(1,1), 
and firm 2 captures all the rent associated with the standard.  Alternatively, if technology 1 
has only an imperfect substitute, so Δ1 > 0, then there is a continuum of equilibria. 
 It is easy to describe hold-up in this model.  Suppose that the production-cost-
minimizing standard has been adopted without ex ante competition.  If firms 1 and 2 then 
proceed ex post to set royalty rates, the only constraint binding them is (17d).  If licensors’ 
expectations were based on the assumption that all of inequalities (17) would be satisfied, 
hold-up may have occurred.  There are an infinite number of equilibria of the game above 
with (17d) alone replacing (17).  Because these ex post equilibria are not constrained by the 
presence of second-best technologies, they may involve higher rates charged by both firms.  
Of course, if neither firm’s technology had a good substitute, the total royalty rate, a1+a2, 
would only be constrained by (17d) ex ante, so there could be no hold-up in terms of the total 
rate.  More generally, the firms most likely to benefit from the absence of ex ante competition 
are those with close substitute technologies, since the tight competitive constraint provided by 
those technologies ex ante is eliminated once the standard is set.  At the other extreme, if one 
firm has the only viable technology for some component, it is less likely to benefit from a 
shift from all of (17) to (17d) alone.  Indeed, in the polar case discussed above in which one 
firm captures all the rents in ex ante competition, there will be a continuum of ex post 
equilibria in which its returns are lower.  It would thus likely gain from ex ante competition. 
 With M components, there are 2M potential standards in this model, and thus 2M 
constraining inequalities corresponding to (17): 2M – 1 involving differences between costs 
under alternative standards and costs under the standard that minimizes production cost, and 
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 one comparing total costs to CT.  The right-hand sides of all these inequalities are non-
negative, so all are satisfied by ai = 0 for all i.  If it is not possible to increase any ai without 
violating any inequalities, ai = 0 for all i is an equilibrium.  In general, any point at which all 
ai are non-negative and it is not possible to increase any ai without violating a constraining 
inequality is an equilibrium. 
 As when M = 2, there may be an infinite number of equilibria of this game.  Similarly, 
if the first-best technology for component i has a perfect substitute, the inequality on ai alone 
(which corresponds to (17a) or (17b)) ensures that it cannot charge positive royalties in 
equilibrium.  And if the first-best technology for component j has no substitutes, so that all 
standards that do not use it have prohibitively high production costs, then the only inequality 
that constrains aj is the one that corresponds to (17d). 
 While the equilibria described above are delicate,30 they have a number of desirable 
properties.  There is no hold-up or royalty-stacking.  The best standard is adopted,31 and 
patents that are essential to that standard are rewarded on the basis of their incremental 
contributions to the value of the standard, which strikes most observers as fair.32   
 We now consider relaxing the four assumptions listed above.  The most natural way to 
relax assumption (4), that market size is fixed as long as total cost is below CT,  when M = 2 
would be to replace constraint (17d) with a function giving total sales of the final product as a 
declining function of production cost plus royalty cost. Thus if firm 1’s royalty is otherwise 
unconstrained, raising it slightly would raise the cost of the final product slightly, reducing the 
number of units sold, and thus reducing the number of units on which it and firm 2 receive 
royalties.  But, a la Cournot [1838], firm 1 would rationally ignore the impact of its royalty-
setting on firm 2’s royalties, and the incentive for royalty-stacking would emerge.  But while 
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 even this rigorous ex ante competition doesn’t eliminate the incentive for royalty-stacking, the 
ex ante presence of substitute technologies may substantially constrain licensors’ ability to 
respond to that incentive.  To take an extreme example, if when M =2 both first-best 
technologies have perfect substitutes, both will be constrained to charge zero royalties 
regardless of the demand function for the final product. 
 Assumption (1), that potential standards differ only in their implications for the cost of 
the final product, not in their implications for the attributes or overall quality of that product, 
implies that all decisions would be unanimous.  But if it would cost more to implement some 
standard A than an alternative standard B and the former would produce higher quality 
products, firms that served different geographic markets or different market segments might 
well disagree on which was the better standard.33  Firms with different production assets 
might even disagree about production cost.  Bid evaluation under such conditions would not 
be simply a trivial matter of comparing total costs, and the identity of the bid evaluators 
and/or the details of the SSO’s decision-making process could determine the outcome.   
 Assumption (2), that the cost implications of alternative standards is known ex ante, is 
critical because such knowledge is essential to evaluate patent-holders’ bids.  But it is also 
extremely unrealistic.  In a standard of any complexity, writing down the counterparts of (17) 
would require knowing the cost implications of many potential standards, only one of which 
will ultimately be adopted.  With only 20 components, for instance, the cost characteristics of 
over a million potential standards would have to be evaluated – even after all first- and 
second-best technologies have been identified.  Moreover, standard-setting is a process that 
unfolds over time, during which information is exchanged and participants refine their 
understanding of the characteristics of alternative technologies and alternative potential 
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 standards.  Indeed, as Miller [2007] and Hovenkamp [2008] have stressed, claims of pending 
patents can be altered during that process.  Thus if competition takes place too early, it is 
likely to be based on poor information, while if it takes place too late, the standard may be 
largely determined and hold-up may be unavoidable. 
 Finally, assumption (3), that the value of any standard to all potential users depends 
only on the total unit cost of the final product that it implies and not on the ownership of the 
underlying intellectual property, may seem innocuous, but it is inconsistent with the 
increasingly common presence of both integrated firms and innovation specialists in standard-
setting processes.   
 To illustrate this point, consider the model of the preceding section with M = 1.  
Suppose there are two bids on the table, one from integrated firm 1 and one from an upstream 
innovation specialist.  Both would enable production at unit cost C, and both bidders would 
charge per-unit royalty r.   The integrated firm would clearly vote for its own standard, as it 
would rather receive royalties than pay them, and charging its rivals royalties would give it a 
cost advantage over them.34  The innovation specialist, if it had a seat at the table, would vote 
for its own standard, since if it does not receive royalties it has no income.   
 What about firms 2, …, N, which, by assumption, would license the patent underlying 
the standard selected and compete with firm 1?  From (12), if the innovation specialist’s bid 
were accepted, each such manufacturing specialist could look forward to profit of 
(18a)   ( )
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⎪⎬   i = 2, …, N, 
while if integrated firm1’s bid were accepted, the typical manufacturing specialist would earn 
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  i = 2, …, N. 
If γ = 0 there is no competition among manufacturing firms, and firms 2, …, N would be 
indifferent between the two bids.  But for γ > 0, they would clearly prefer the standard offered 
by the innovation specialist.  While their per-unit royalty payments would be the same under 
both standards, (18a) shows the results of competition in which all manufacturers pay r, while 
(18b) shows what happens when firms 2, …, N pay r but firm 1 does not.  If royalty rates are 
equal, manufacturing specialists always prefer standards offered by innovation specialists.35  
The presence of integrated firms adds a strategic dimension to bid evaluation.   
  The analysis of this section has shown that the desirable properties of formal, 
transparent ex ante competition are unlikely to be realizable in practice.  In Section VI we 
discuss whether more limited use of ex ante competition might nonetheless be desirable. 36    
 
V. COLLECTIVE EX ANTE NEGOTIATION 
 The US and the EU have recently moved in the direction of revising antitrust policy to 
allow collective negotiation of royalty terms before standards are set, echoing aspects of 
Galbraith’s [1952] endorsement of an economy with widespread ‘countervailing power’ 
between upstream and downstream firms with market power.   
 In its Technology Transfer Guidelines, the European Commission [2004, ¶225] states 
Undertakings setting up a technology pool … , and any industry standard that 
it may support, are normally free to negotiate and fix royalties for the 
technology package and each share of the royalties either before or after the 
standard is set. 
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 But for the slight ambiguity introduced by ‘normally’ and the question of whether this 
approval applies outside the context of patent pools, this would be a blanket endorsement of 
collective negotiation of royalty rates.  
 In their recent intellectual property report, the US Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission [2007, p. 52] make a broader assertion: 
In most cases, it is likely that the Agencies would find that joint ex ante 
activity undertaken by an SSO or its members to establish licensing terms as 
part of the standard-setting process is likely to confer substantial 
procompetitive benefits… 
Though the agencies go on to say that ‘joint ex ante licensing negotiations may raise 
competition concerns in some settings,’ they give only an extreme example (forcing down the 
royalty rate for the only acceptable technology), and they cite Majoras [2005] for the 
proposition that collective negotiation rarely poses a risk to innovation incentives.37   
 Some commentators would go even farther.  Skitol [2005, p 729], for instance, argues 
that SSOs should have an antitrust duty to implement ex ante mechanisms to avoid hold-up 
and that such mechanisms could include ‘collective negotiation of the license agreement.’38 
 Unlike formal ex ante competition, there is no reason to doubt the general workability 
of collective negotiation.  On the other hand, there are at least two reasons why bargaining 
behind closed doors may not produce socially desirable results.39  First, the different strategic 
positions of integrated firms and innovation specialists may lead to the selection of inferior 
standards.  Second, collective negotiation risks inducing a sub-optimal pace of invention and 
technological process. 
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  To illustrate the first problem, consider again a situation in which a single innovation 
specialist and a single integrated firm, firm 1, offer competing standards with identical unit 
production cost C.  Suppose the innovation specialist offers a per-unit royalty of s, and the 
integrated firm offers a per-unit royalty of r.  Let us suppose that voting in the standard-
setting organization is such that manufacturing specialists, firms 2, …, N, will determine 
which standard is selected.  It follows from equations (18) that the manufacturing specialists 
will be indifferent between these two offers if s = 2r/(2-γ); as long as γ is positive, firm 1 must 
charge a lower royalty rate in order to offset the reluctance of manufacturing specialists to 
compete against it with a cost disadvantage.  
 Suppose first that side payments are not possible.  Then the bargaining process 
amounts to Bertrand competition between the integrated firm and the innovation specialist for 
the votes of the manufacturing specialists.  Since the specialists’ profits are decreasing in the 
royalty rate, one would expect both royalty rates to be driven toward zero.  As s → 0, the 
profit of the innovation specialist goes to zero, since royalties are its only source of revenue.  
On the other hand, as r → 0, firm 1’s profit approaches a positive quantity: its earnings as a 
manufacturing specialist in a royalty-free N-firm industry.  Thus if the innovation specialist 
has positive fixed costs of licensing or from any other source, the integrated firm can always 
offer an  > 0 low enough that if the innovation specialist were to offer r (2 / 2 ,s r )γ≤ −  the 
specialist’s royalty revenues would not cover its fixed costs.  This asymmetry thus favors the 
integrated firm over the innovation specialist.40 
 Now suppose that side payments are possible.  In this case, it is natural to assume that 
the standard that leads to higher total industry profit, rather than the one that maximizes the 
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 profits of the manufacturing specialists alone, would prevail in negotiation.  If the innovation 
specialist’s standard were adopted, total industry profits would be 
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The first term is the innovation specialist’s royalty revenues, and the second is the total profit 
of the N manufacturing firms.  It is easy to show that this quantity is maximized by 
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With this royalty rate, the manufacturing firms produce the monopoly/cartel output and share 
the resulting profits with the innovation specialist.  Call this outcome regime IS. 
 If the integrated firm’s standard were adopted instead, total industry profits would be 
(21) 
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 The terms on the right are the integrated firm’s operating profit, its royalty revenue, and the 
total operating profit of the remaining (N-1) manufacturers, respectively.  This quantity is 
maximized by41 
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Call this outcome regime IF. 
 When γ = 0, total industry profits are maximized with zero royalties in both regimes.  
When γ = 1, firm 1 sets r just high enough to induce its rivals to produce zero, and it produces 
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 the entire monopoly/cartel output itself.  In these extreme cases, the two regimes yield the 
same value of total profit.  For 0 < γ < 1, however, firm 1 produces more in regime IF than it 
would in regime IS, while firms 2, …, N produce less.  This asymmetry in outputs in regime 
IF reduces maximum total industry profit below that in regime IS.  For γ = 1/2, for instance, 
the ratio of maximized total industry profits is 
(23)   
( )( )
( )
2*
2*
1 45 22 3
,
2 5 3
IF
T
IS
T
N N N
N N
+ + −Π =Π +    
which is less than one for all N ≥ 2.42   
 Thus if side payments are possible, the integrated firm is at a strategic disadvantage in 
collective negotiation with equivalent technologies because it cannot cartelize the industry, 
while, as we showed above, if side payments are not possible, the innovation specialist is 
disadvantaged if it has fixed costs.  It follows by continuity that if the advantaged firm has a 
slightly inferior technology (slightly higher production costs) it can nonetheless prevail in 
negotiation.  Of course, without a reliable general model of real-world collective negotiation, 
it is unclear which sort of firm would be advantaged by how much under what conditions. 
 The second basic reason to be concerned about collective negotiation of royalty rates 
is the possible retardation of the pace of innovation.  Collective negotiation necessarily entails 
the exercise of the collective monopsony power of potential licensees.  To the extent that this 
leads to lower royalty rates, the incentives to develop new intellectual property are reduced.  
In addition, when integrated firms are engaged in collective decision-making about royalty 
rates, there is some risk of collusion to reduce innovative efforts. 
 One might argue that the rate of innovation or at least of patenting is in fact too high in 
some sectors, particularly those in which the patent thicket problem is severe.  A problem 
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 with this argument is that the returns to major innovations would be reduced by collective 
negotiation, not just the returns to the minor advances that contribute more to patent thickets 
than to real progress.  Alternatively, one could contend that in many industries the probability 
that any given innovation will be involved in standard-setting is low enough that the general 
use of collective negotiation in standard-setting would not have a major impact on the 
expected returns to innovation.  This argument does not seem persuasive in the 
IT/communications sector, however, where standard-setting is of central importance.   
 Those who favor collective negotiation generally stress the importance of bringing 
existing knowledge more efficiently to the marketplace; they typically either ignore or dismiss 
the possible adverse impact of collective negotiation on the generation of useful knowledge.43  
Some argue that antitrust authorities would be able to prevent ‘monopsonistic behavior that 
leads to allocative inefficiencies by unreasonably suppressing prices for IP used in 
standards,’44 but without standards for the reasonability of such prices, it is hard to predict 
how, if at all, antitrust supervision of collective negotiation would limit the exercise of 
monopsony power.  
  
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 The analysis of preceding sections has not revealed a simple and comprehensive 
solution to royalty-stacking and hold-up in standard-setting.  While innovation specialists 
have received much of the blame for standard-setting problems and controversies, Section III 
showed that the royalty-setting behavior of integrated firms is equally affected by strategic 
considerations, so that a strong policy bias against innovation specialists would be hard to 
justify.  Section IV presented conditions under which formal ex ante competition among 
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 potential licensors could eliminate hold-up and mitigate royalty-stacking but argued that this 
approach is unlikely to be workable in practice.  Section V contended that allowing potential 
licensees to act as a buyers’ cartel to negotiate royalty rates would risk biasing standard-
setting processes and slowing the pace of technical progress.  The remainder of this section 
briefly considers some less comprehensive policy alternatives. 
 The U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s recent N-Data settlement involves expanding 
the reach of antitrust policy to reduce troll-like behavior as well as hold-up.  In that case, the 
Commission asserted that behavior by a patent-holder during standard-setting that led to 
higher royalties (charging a royalty higher than that promised by a prior owner of the patent) 
was an ‘unfair method of competition’ and thus a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, even 
though the Commission did not contend that the behavior in question gave rise to monopoly 
power or even market power.45  If in some future case this interpretation of the Commission’s 
authority under Section 5 is contested in and upheld by the courts, the door would be open to 
a US antitrust policy regime in which deception in standard-setting would be an offense even 
if it could not be shown to affect the standard adopted.  
 While it may be appropriate to make at least certain forms of deceptive conduct in 
standard-setting illegal even absent an impact on the standard selected, however, it does not 
seem particularly natural to do this under the antitrust umbrella.  In US and the EU, 
competition policy has in recent decades been focused on the socially undesirable acquisition 
or exercise of market or monopoly power.  It has not established or even sought to establish 
principles of ‘unfair competition’ that do not involve market power. 
  For this reason among others, Kobayashi and Wright [2009] argue that antitrust is less 
well-suited to deal with deception in standard-setting than the US patent law doctrine of 
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 equitable estoppel: roughly, the principle that if a patent-holder engages in deception on 
which another party relies, it cannot sue that other party for patent infringement.  They also 
argue that provisions of state contract and tort laws can be used to deal with troll-like 
behavior and hold-up.  Further, individual firms have always been able to protect themselves 
from hold-up (though not, of course, from troll-like behavior) by bilateral ex ante negotiation 
of royalty rates.46  When coupled with a FRAND commitment not to charge substantially 
different royalty rates ex post to similarly situated licensees, licenses obtained ex ante by a 
few firms can serve to extend some measure of hold-up protection to other potential licensees. 
Of course, since many observers consider these tools to have proven inadequate in aggregate, 
it may be useful to sharpen one or more of them legislatively. 
 Antitrust authorities have played a generally positive role in recent years by enabling 
practices and processes that serve to reduce ex ante uncertainty regarding ex post licensing 
terms, though, as I argued in Section V, they seem to have been too little concerned with the 
dangers of licensee collusion.  The movement on both sides of the Atlantic away from per se 
condemnation of consideration of royalty rates in standard-setting processes is certainly a 
positive step, for instance.  In addition, the favorable business review letters issued in 2006 
and 2007 by the US Department of Justice in response to proposals from two standard-setting 
organizations – VITA and IEEE-SA, respectively, are at least interesting experiments with 
multi-lateral mechanisms to reduce ex ante uncertainty that stop short of both collective 
negotiation and formal ex ante competition.47   
 The core of the VITA proposal is a requirement that participants in any standard-
setting processes disclose all patents that may become essential to the standard being 
developed, along with the maximum royalty rates and the most restrictive non-royalty 
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 provisions they would demand.  Individual working group members are permitted to consider 
these rates and terms in developing the standard, but they are not permitted to negotiate or 
discuss them. The IEEE-SA proposal involves voluntary disclosure of potentially essential 
patents, along with maximum royalty rates or most restrictive non-royalty terms.  If patents 
and licensing terms are disclosed, working groups may use them to evaluate the relative costs 
of alternative standards, though specific licensing terms may not be discussed.48 
 Both mechanisms involve limitations on communication.  If these limitations prove 
unenforceable, these mechanisms may enable licensee collusion.  In its response to the IEEE-
SA (Barnett [2007]), the US Department of Justice noted that discussions of costs ‘could … 
rise to the level of joint negotiation of licensing terms’ but simply said that such negotiation 
would be analyzed under the rule of reason, which could be read as encouragement of 
collective negotiation.  In any case, experience with these two new mechanisms should be 
carefully monitored so that it can help shape future policies toward SSOs and their activities. 
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NOTES 
 
1 http://standards.ieee.org/announcements/media.html. 
2 Ibid. 
3 As Shapiro [2001b] notes, quality, design, or performance standards can be more easily used 
as collusive or exclusionary devices than the compatibility standards that are most common in 
the IT/communications sector. 
4 See Geradin [2006] for a useful general discussion of standard-setting processes. 
5 Lévêque and Ménière [2008]. 
6 See Tirole et al [2003] and Rysman and Simcoe [2008]. 
7 For discussions of relevant US proceedings, see Farrell et al [2007], Ganske [2008], 
Hovenkamp [2008], and Wright [2009].  Zoettl et al [2009] provide a global overview of 
recent developments at the intersection of antitrust and patent law. 
8 This strategy, which involves accumulation of large patent portfolios for strategic reasons, 
has been colorfully described as ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ by the US Federal Trade 
Commission [2003, ch. 2, pp. 30-31].  
9 In the US, see Jaffe and Lerner [2004], US Federal Trade Commission [2003], US National 
Academy of Science [2004], and, for an analysis stressing differences among industries, Burk 
and Lemley [2009].  Harhoff  [2006] and Harhoff et al [2007] argue that these problems are 
emerging in the EU. 
10 For discussions of this issue, see Shapiro [2001a] and Padilla and Teece [2007]. 
11 Other factors may also have complicated standard-setting.  For instance, Simcoe [2008] 
argues that the slow-down in standards production at the Internet Engineering Task Force 
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between 1993 and 2003 can be attributed in large measure to distributional conflicts created 
by the rapid commercialization of the Internet. 
12 For discussions see Geradin et al [2008c], Padilla and Teece [2007] and the references they 
cite.  Simcoe [2006] attributes the rapid increase in intellectual property disclosure in a 
sample of standard-setting organizations in the early 1990s to the rise of small innovation 
specialist firms.  This development would have been impossible without strong intellectual 
property rights.  For example, Hall and Ziedonis [2001] argue that the strengthening of patent 
rights in the 1980s contributed to the rise of ‘fabless’ semiconductor design firms. 
13 See the references cited in note 7, above.   
14 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. ___ (2006), slip opinion available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-130.pdf. The discussions of ‘non-
practicing entities’ by the US Federal Trade Commission [2003; ch. 2, pp. 30-31; ch. 3, pp. 
38-41] provide additional evidence of pervasive hostility; see also the references cited by 
Geradin et al [2008c]. 
15 See Lemley [2008, n. 2] on the origin of this term.  Some observers confine the use of the 
term ‘troll’ to small firms that acquire patents only for the purpose of suing and would use the 
term ‘patent ambush’ for the behavior described here.  Lemely [2008], Geradin et al [2008c], 
and the references they cite provide discussions of alternative definitions. 
16 On the Rambus case, see Wright [2009]; more general discussions of related issues are 
provided by Farrell et al [2007], Villarejo and Banasevic [2008], and Hovenkamp [2008].  
17 Large technology-based firms may have portfolios of thousands of patents, each with 
multiple claims.  To require a single complete search would be sufficiently burdensome as to 
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discourage participation in standard-setting, and multiple searches might be required as a 
standard-setting process shifts direction over time and patent portfolios change.  (See Miller 
[2007] on this latter point.) Thus few SSOs require even a single complete search, but without 
a complete search, individuals participating in standard-setting may be unaware of relevant 
patents held by their employers.  Further complications are the incentive to over-disclose to 
avoid litigation and the offsetting incentive to make only vague disclosures in order not to 
reveal R&D strategies.  For relevant discussions, see Chiao et al [2007], Farrell et al [2007], 
Lemley [2002], and Simcoe [2006].  
18 Lévêque and Ménière [2007] show that reducing or eliminating the risk of hold-up by all 
potential licensors may benefit licensors as well as consumers by encouraging the entry of 
manufacturing specialists. 
19 See Chiao et al [2007] and Lemley [2002].  In what follows I will use FRAND to refer to 
both sorts of commitment for simplicity. 
20 Thus, for instance, the US Federal Trade Commission recently found that a reasonable 
royalty is ‘the amount the industry participants would have been willing to pay to use a 
technology over its next best alternative prior to the incorporation of the technology into a 
standard’ (Opinion of the Commission on Remedy, In re Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket 9302, at 
17, February 5, 2007, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/070205opinion.pdf ).  
Geradin et al [2008b] and Geradin and Rato [2007] reject this standard and argue that 
FRAND simply implies a commitment to negotiate in good faith.  Miller [2007] argues that 
signatories to FRAND commitments have given up the right to obtain injunctive relief.  
Layne-Farrar et al [2007] note that some have argued that FRAND implies ‘numerical 
 42 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
proportionality’: all essential patents should receive equal royalty rates.  Lemley [2002] 
argues that FRAND is a commitment to license, with a court to determine whether the offered 
rates are reasonable. 
21 The available evidence, such as it is, suggests that royalty-stacking is not generally 
important: compare Shapiro [2006], Lemley and Shapiro [2007], Geradin et al [2008a], 
Denicolò et al [2007], and Padilla and Teece [2007]. 
22 It does not seem uncommon for royalty agreements in practice to involve lump-sum 
payments instead of or in addition to per-unit or ad valorem royalties.  It is worth noting, 
however, that if a royalty agreement involves a substantial lump-sum component, it will 
differentially disadvantage small firms and may thus be challenged as violating the non-
discrimination portion of a FRAND commitment. 
23 Kim [2004] analyzes this same two-stage model with γ = 1, while Schmidt [2008] considers 
a more general model of downstream competition.  The standard-padding model of 
Dewatripont and Legros [2008] is also related to this analysis, though they assume away 
downstream competition and use the Shapley value rather than some non-cooperative process 
to divide royalties among holders of essential patents.  
24 In more realistic settings in which firms differ – perhaps because of differences in 
intellectual property, manufacturing facilities, or distribution channels – standards that would 
raise total welfare may also fail to be adopted because they would increase the profits of some 
firms but not others. 
25 Schmidt [2008] provides a useful exposition. 
26 See, e.g., Shapiro [1985]. 
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[
27 It is straightforward to demonstrate that the qualitative comparisons in this paragraph also 
hold when N = 2 for any ]0,1γ ∈ . 
28 This model builds on the analysis of Layne-Farrar et al [2007, Sect. IV.A.] and seems 
broadly consistent with the discussion in Farrell et al [2007, p. 642]. 
29 If this assumption alone is violated, the bid evaluator’s task becomes more complex to 
describe precisely, but it remains fundamentally the same: to compare total royalty plus 
production cost for all possible standards.  
30 If one firm sets its royalty rate a penny too high so that even one inequality is violated, all 
get zero.  When there are multiple equilibria, as there typically are, it is not clear how a 
bidding game could be designed to select one of them in practice.  
31 I am indebted to a referee for the observation that this property follows from Theorem 2 in 
Bernheim and Whinston [1986], since the firms in this model are restricted to make 
unconditional bids. 
32 Layne-Farrar et al [2007, Section IV.B] discuss ex ante application of the Shapley value 
from cooperative game theory as a fairness-driven alternative to ex ante competition.  The 
Shapley value approach also bases rewards on incremental contributions, but it has the 
somewhat unpalatable implication that technologies considered but not included in a standard 
typically receive positive royalties. 
33 If quality differences were simple enough – relating only to durability, for instance, or to 
the flow of homogeneous services provided – all participants might have the same willingness 
to pay for increments to quality.  But such unanimity will hold only in very special cases.  
34 See the discussion of the ‘toehold effect’ by Geradin et al [2008b]. 
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35 Consumers might disagree.  It is easy to show that with equal royalty rates total output 
would be higher under the integrated firm’s standard than if the innovation specialist 
prevailed.  Evaluating derivatives of equation (3) at r = 0 shows that for small and equal 
royalty rates, consumers would prefer the integrated firm’s standard.  
36 For more extensive discussions of the limitations of formal ex ante competition, see 
Geradin [2006], Geradin and Layne-Farrar [2007], and Geradin et al [2008b]. 
37 See also Antitrust Modernization Commission [2007, ch. I.D], where a rule of reason 
analysis of collective negotiation is recommended, but no guidelines for such analyses are 
provided, and Masoudi [2007]. 
38 See also Lemley [2007]. 
39 For other discussions of collective negotiation, see Geradin [2006], Layne-Farrar et al 
[2008], Lemley [2007], Sidak [2008], and Swanson and Baumol [2005, pp. 13-14].  Note that 
with downward-sloping demand for the final product, collective negotiation without a licensor 
cartel will not remove incentives for royalty-stacking.  And, as with ex ante competition, since 
knowledge accumulates during standard-setting processes it is not clear when negotiations 
should take place. 
40 This is, again, related to the toehold effect discussed by Geradin et al [2008b]. 
41 The denominator on the right of equation (22) is always positive in the relevant region.  It is 
minimized as a function of γ at γ = (2N-1)/3(N-1).  It is positive at that point when  N = 2 and 
increasing in N for N ≥ 2. 
42 Numerical evaluation shows that for 0 < γ < 1 and 2 ≤ N ≤ 30, the ratio of maximum total 
profit in regime IF to that in regime IS declines with N: as N rises, both r and s are optimally 
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increased to restrict competition, but higher values of r magnify the profit-reducing output 
distortion between firm 1 and the other manufacturers.  For N in this range, this ratio is 
minimized for 0.65 < γ < 0.85 and the minima always exceed 0.89. 
43 Thus while the Antitrust Modernization Commission [2007, p. 121] notes that the exercise 
of shared monopsony power might force rates below ‘a reasonable level,’ it does not suggest 
how this danger might be avoided.  In a widely-cited speech, Majoras [2005] argues that if 
SSO members jointly lack buying power, ‘they would be not be able to impose a lower than 
competitive rate,’ though in that case it is not clear what the point of joint negotiations would 
be.   She argues that the exercise of monopsony power would be limited both by patent-
holders’ ability to decline to participate (and risk having their technologies excluded from the 
standard) and by mutual forbearance among integrated firms (which would also operate 
without collective negotiation).  Skitol [2005] argues that a variety of untested procedural 
safeguards could avoid licensee cartel behavior, and Farrell et al [2007, pp. 632-3] simply 
assert that it is worth running some risk of licensee cartel behavior in order to reduce the hold-
up problem.  On this last assertion, see Sidak [2008]. 
44 This language is from Meyer [2008], then a senior official in the US Department of Justice.  
His subsequent assertion that SSOs ‘should be confident that they have substantial legal 
breathing room’ seems to signal that antitrust supervision in the US would be very permissive. 
45 On the N-Data settlement, see the Commission’s statement, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122statement.pdf,  as well as the dissent by 
Chairman Majoras, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122majoras.pdf.  
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See also Froeb and Ganglmair [2009], Ganske [2008], Lande [2009], Kobayashi and Wright 
[2009], and Layne-Farrar [2009]. 
46 See Layne-Farrar et al [2008] for a useful comparison of ex ante bilateral negotiation with 
collective negotiation, and see Farrell et al [2007, pp. 238-41] for a discussion of non-
discriminatory royalties.  Note that if a technology licensed ex ante is not included in a 
standard ex post, the licensee will generally be out only its licensing costs – which one could 
think of as the premium for insurance against hold-up. 
47 Barnett [2006] and [2007].  See Masoudi [2007] for discussions and  more detailed 
summaries of these proposals, and see Sidak [2008] for a critique.   
48 Disclosures to the IEEE-SA are posted on its website, http://standards.ieee.org/db/patents/.  
It is interesting that as of July, 2008, no maximum rates had been posted.  
